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Competitiveness and Convergence: the Open 
Method of Co-ordination in Latin America
Latin  America  has  entered the twenty-first  century  with  comparatively  sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals relative to past decades, with democratic govern-
ments, and with a much improved business climate. The region’s average growth 
rate was up a resounding 5.6 percent in 2004, the highest rate registered since 
1980, and then continued to expand at a healthy pace of 4.1 percent in 2005. 
Inflation  has  been  brought  under  control  and,  in  many  countries,  inflation-
targeting, flexible exchange rate regimes, and central bank independence have 
played  a  key  role.  These  developments  have  led  to  a  more  buoyant  mood 
regarding the region’s short-term economic outlook. 
Despite the favorable  climate,  a number of problems continue to plague the 
region,  including persistently  high debt burdens,  income inequality,  and other 
structural weaknesses that deprive many countries of a significant boost to their 
competitiveness and long-term growth prospects and leave them vulnerable to 
external  shocks.  Latin  America  still  suffers  from one  of  the most  inequitable 
income distributions in the world, social tensions, and a growing sense of reform 
fatigue.  Moreover,  the  region  seems  to  be  losing  ground  as  foreign  direct 
investment and trade shares shift to other developing regions, notably Asia and 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
The buoyant conditions of the past couple of years have opened a window of 
opportunity to creatively address many of these important challenges. Failure to 
take  this  opportunity  poses  risks  to  the region,  to  the  growth  of  per  capita 
incomes,  to  the  stable  evolution  of  its  institutions,  and,  ultimately,  to  the 
region’s place in the world economy, both in terms of its relative contribution to 
world GDP and, perhaps  more importantly,  in terms of its ability  to compete 
effectively in an increasingly complex and sophisticated global  environment  in 
which countries that stand still rapidly fall  behind. In this context, it is crucial 
that  Latin  American  governments  invest  in  efforts  to  improve  their 
competitiveness and build the institutions and policies necessary for sustained 
economic growth and prosperity of its citizens.
Klaus Schwab, 'Preface', Latin American Competitiveness Review 2006, World 
Economic Forum, 2006.
States, International Institutions and the Politics of Global 
Competitiveness
We live in a new age of global competitiveness – one in which the dynamics of 
global capitalist competition are more present and powerful than ever before, 
and in which the systemic conditions that drive competitiveness further forward 
and purposive action in promoting it are mutually reinforcing, if also contested. 
Over  the  last  two  decades  international  institutions  have  been  acting  with 
increasing purpose to promote unimpeded capital accumulation on a global scale. 
They support and draw support from governments  committed to such reforms, 
and  coax  other  governments  towards  desired  reforms  where  they  remain 
reluctant. They are therefore deeply involved in national politics, and central to 
alliances that promote the politics of competitiveness (Cammack, 2003). 
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The first  paper in  this  series  identified  a ‘convergence club’  model  of  policy 
transfer – originating in the OECD and vigorously practised by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, including the multilateral banks, and by the EU – aimed at creating a 
global  economy  permeated  throughout  by  the  disciplines  of  competitive 
capitalism (Cammack 2006a). It showed how such institutions operate not above 
or  in  isolation  from  states,  but  through  the  agency of  states,  which  they 
simultaneously seek to transform. Imposition from above is not ruled out (for 
example, where states have ‘pooled’ sovereignty or assented to legally binding 
frameworks at supranational level, as in the EU or the WTO), but as a general 
rule the task of carrying out proposed reforms and building support for them 
among citizens is explicitly assigned to the national state.1
International institutions can be understood, then, as seeking to bring into being 
a  new  global  order  in  which  states  individually  and  collectively  maintain 
conditions in which capital is hegemonic over labour, and in which the manner in 
which  they  ‘compete’  with  each  other  promotes  rather  than  runs  counter  to 
dynamics of competitiveness on a global level. The objective is a global order 
entirely shaped by the logic of capital: one in which macroeconomic stability is 
secured as far as possible at global level by domestic discipline and global co-
ordination;  internationally  agreed  regimes  and  standards  stave  off  as  far  a 
possible the threat of  financial  crisis;  states refrain from corruption and from 
protecting ‘national capital’, but vie with each other to offer ‘better climates for 
investment’; and the free movement of capital, goods and workers guarantees 
the global reach of capital and enhances its power to transform social relations. A 
wide range of strategies may be adopted in pursuit of these ends.
1 This makes it misleading to counterpose supranational institutions and states in zero 
sum terms. Their interaction is better captured by the idea of 'meta-governance' than 
by the contrast between state sovereignty on the one hand and its eclipse on the other 
around which much debate on the EU revolves. Various approaches – Gill's ‘new 
constitutionalism’ (2001), Jayasuriya’s ‘new regulatory state’ (2004), and Jessop’s 
‘multi-scalar meta-governance’ (2006) reflect this broad perspective, as does my own 
approach to the governance of global capitalism (Cammack, 2002), and to the ‘politics 
of global competitiveness’ (Cammack, 2006a). For Gill, the international governance 
framework of the new constitutionalism “seeks to separate economic policies from 
broad political accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the 
discipline of market forces, and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic 
forces and processes”, which in turn “involves actively remaking state apparatuses and 
governmental practices and the institutions of civil society” (Gill, 2001: 47, 51). Both 
Jayasuriya and Jessop reject the “fundamental binary divide between the national and 
the global that is constitutive of the ‘Westphalian’ model of sovereignty” (Jayasuriya, 
2004: 488-9), and both characterise the steering role of international institutions as an 
instance of meta-governance focused on the state.
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The Open Method of Co-ordination
Against  this  background,  two  aspects  of  the  growing  literature  on  the  open 
method of co-ordination (OMC) in the European Union hinder an understanding 
of its significance. First, it is generally addressed, within the terms of familiar 
debates over broader aspects of European integration, as if it were something 
uniquely European; and second, the great majority of commentators have been 
rather more interested in the potential for extending the method to new areas 
than in its particular place within the politics of global competitiveness.2 
The ‘Lisbon process’ did not inaugurate either the open method of co-ordination 
or the promotion of global competitiveness. Even so, the OMC as adopted at the 
Lisbon  Summit  of  March  2000  constitutes  perhaps  the  most  formal  and 
comprehensive mechanism for the promotion of convergence on policies intended 
to secure global  competitiveness (Cammack, 2006a: 8-9).  And if  attention is 
centred on  the  promotion  of  convergence  on  policies  generative  of  global 
competitiveness,  the OMC falls into place as a key element in a  hierarchy of 
policy modes, at the same time subordinate and complementary to the ‘harder’ 
modes of the Community Method and binding regulation in monetary and fiscal 
areas. It can be seen as it was initially conceived – as a means of disseminating 
the logic of monetary and fiscal policy across other (social) policy areas through 
the agency of  national  government  and the  medium of  national  action plans 
shaped by benchmarking and related mechanisms.  At the Lisbon Council, after 
all, economic, social and employment policies were seen as linked aspects of a 
‘new strategic goal’ focused on competitiveness, within which social protection 
was to be developed as a ‘productive factor’ (that is, reshaped so that it could 
contribute to fostering productivity and competitiveness).  It  was not intended 
that  it  should  have  its  own  space  to  develop  as  a  counter  to  the  logic  of 
2 A full critique of the literature will be offered in a later paper in this series. First, the 
debate has tended to focus on the EU-specific issue of supranationalism versus inter-
governmentalism, or to revolve around the merits of varied imported institutionalist, 
constructivist or game theoretic approaches – none of them helpful. Second, more 
attention is devoted to the variety of policy modes than to the relationship between 
them. See Hodson and Maher, 2001; Scott and Trubek, 2002; Borras and Jacobsson 
2004; and Bruno et al, 2006. Schäfer (2006: 71) does note the neglect of systematic 
comparison in the literature, and compares the OMC with multilateral surveillance by 
the OECD and the IMF. But as he confines himself to procedure rather than content, 
he misses the common commitment to convergence on policies conducive to global 
competitiveness. It is symptomatic of the judgement offered here that not one of 
three recent discussions of the literature – Caporaso and Wittenbrinck, 2006;  Köhler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006; and Citi and Rhodes, 2007 – attaches more than passing 
significance to the link between the OMC  and the pursuit of competitiveness.
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competitiveness (European Commission, 2000: 6, 20; cf. European Commission 
2006a: 3). The open method of co-ordination as originally devised, then, is not 
open-ended: it is a means to co-ordinate the policies of governments which have 
internalised the underlying project to varying extents, and to bring other policies 
into line with the hard core of the politics of global competitiveness.3 
The  European Union has powerful  tools  at  its  disposal  for  the supranational 
management of monetary and fiscal orthodoxy on which the OMC rests. But the 
OMC itself is illustrative of a general pattern in which meta-governance aims to 
re-orient state agency in pursuit of global competitiveness.4 This paper sets out 
to show that the open method of co-ordination is as well established in Latin 
America  as  in  the  European  Union,  and that  it  is  embedded in  a  variety  of 
disciplinary processes equivalent in effect to the treaty-based powers of the EU. 
The ‘Lisbon Process’
Building on the EU’s  own formal  definition of  the OMC, and setting it  in  the 
broader context of the promotion of competitiveness that sits at the centre of the 
Lisbon Agenda, we may identify the core components of the ‘Lisbon Process’ of 
which it is a part as consisting of (1) an overall goal of competitiveness in the 
global  economy, (2)  a comprehensive set  of  policy  proposals  stretching from 
monetary,  economic  and  competition  policy  to  complementary  areas  of 
3 Needless to say, this project has been and continues to be contested, and proponents 
of a social Europe not shaped by the logic of competitiveness still abound. Obviously, 
if all governments were equally committed to the project, and equally capable of 
implementing it, there would have been no reason to create mechanisms to steer 
them towards it in the first place. At the same time, the adoption of the open method 
of co-ordination should not be seen as a ‘second-best’ strategy arising out of the 
difficulties associated with imposing a common orientation in key areas of social policy 
from the supranational centre, but as a reflection of the irreplaceable role of national 
governments as architects of strategies of transformation and legitimisation of new 
modes of accumulation in their specific national contexts. This is perfectly reflected in 
the justification for the ‘Community Lisbon Programme’: “While the success of the 
Lisbon partnership for growth and employment depends predominantly on the Member 
States and their determination to introduce the necessary structural reforms, the 
Community dimension of the strategy contributes essential value added. Indeed, 
maximum synergies and efficiency can only be achieved if national reform measures 
are complemented with action at the Community level. The policy measures presented 
in the Community Lisbon Programme all offer a clear value added because of action 
being taken or coordinated at the Community level. This added value is particularly 
obvious for Community policies related to internal market, to improvement of 
infrastructure and to creating better framework conditions for business. Much more 
stress must also be put on policies promoting knowledge, education and skills in order 
to strengthen EU competitiveness and sustainable growth while ensuring social and 
territorial cohesion” (European Commission, 2005b, p. 3).
4 For recent analyses that reflect some of this logic, see  Bruno et al., 2006; Edquist, 
2006; and Annesley and Bulmer, 2006. 
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productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship, labour markets, welfare and social 
policy  (including  pensions),  health,  education,  training  and  skills;  (3)  a 
differentiated framework of implementation combining mandatory commitments 
enshrined in treaty and law which enforce the single market and macro-economic 
orthodoxy  with  ‘soft  law’  procedures  intended  to  promote  convergence  on 
competitiveness-enhancing policies across other policy areas; and (4) a set of 
instruments through which implementation is pursued, ranging from competition 
policy enforceable by law at one end of the spectrum to ‘expert advice’ at the 
other, and encompassing in particular the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, and 
the mix of mutual learning, peer review, surveillance, and benchmarking (with its 
attendant  official  and  unofficial  scorecards  and league  tables)  reflected  in  or 
associated  with  the  ‘Lisbon  Process’  itself.  Box  1  below  offers  a  schematic 
overview of the promotion of competitiveness in the EU in accordance with this 
framework, as a basis for comparison with the case of Latin America. While it 
respects the distinction between treaty-based mechanisms and the process of 
open co-ordination, it also reflects the fact that this distinction does not map 
directly onto a simple dichotomy of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ methods respectively.
Box 1: The promotion of competitiveness in the European Union
Treaty-based mechanisms
Legally enforced
National responsibility
Guidelines
Hard
Soft
EMU, Single Market, Competition 
Policy, Accession Countries
Stability and Growth Pact
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
European Employment Strategy
Open co-ordination (Lisbon Process)
Guidelines
Surveillance 
Benchmarking 
Mutual learning and peer 
review
Hard
Soft
Integrated Guidelines for Growth 
and Jobs
National Reform Programmes
Commission Assessments
Member states implementation 
reports
Transposition of Lisbon Directives
Benchmarking Enterprise Policy
Internal Market Scoreboard
Social Policy Agenda Scoreboard
Mutual learning programme of 
the European Employment 
Strategy
Peer Review and Assessment in 
Social Inclusion (and PROGRESS)
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Social Protection and Social Cohesion within the Lisbon Process
The manner in which the Commission and Council seek to shape social policy 
within an overall framework responsive to the Lisbon agenda is reflected in the 
recent effort to develop a streamlined framework for social protection and social 
cohesion, intended “to create a stronger, more visible OMC with a heightened 
focus on policy implementation, which will  interact  positively with the revised 
Lisbon  strategy” (European  Commission  2005a:  2).  The  framework  covers 
pensions and healthcare as well as social exclusion and poverty. Parallel policy 
proposals  can  be identified  in  all  these  areas  for  Latin  America  (see  ECLAC, 
2004), but for the limited purposes of this paper I am primarily concerned with 
the general ‘overarching’ objectives of the framework, and those relating to the 
poverty and social exclusion (Box 2). 
Box 2: Objectives of OMC for Social Protection and Inclusion
Overarching objectives:
(a)  Promote social cohesion and equal opportunities for all through 
adequate, accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and efficient 
social protection systems and social inclusion policies;
(b)  Interact closely with the Lisbon objectives on achieving greater 
economic growth and more and better jobs, and with the EU’s 
Sustainable Development Strategy
(c)  Strengthen governance, transparency and the involvement of 
stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of policy
In relation to the eradication of poverty and social exclusion:
(d)  Ensure the active social inclusion of all by promoting participation in 
the labour market and by fighting poverty and exclusion among the 
most marginalised people and groups
(e)  Guarantee access for all to the basic resources, rights and social 
services needed for participation in society, while addressing extreme 
forms of exclusion and fighting all forms of discrimination leading to 
exclusion
(f)   Ensure that social inclusion policies are well-coordinated and involve 
all levels of government and relevant actors, including people 
experiencing poverty, that they are efficient and effective and 
mainstreamed into all relevant public policies, including economic, 
budgetary, education and training policies and structural fund (notably 
ESF) programmes and that they are gender mainstreamed.
Source: European Commission 2005a: 5-6.
As we shall see, the same overarching objectives of  (1) equal opportunities for 
all, (2) economic growth and competitiveness, and (3) good governance inform 
parallel co-ordinated proposals for social reform in Latin America.
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The Open Method of Co-ordination in Latin America
In the absence of a single authoritative supranational authority, the co-ordination 
of  financial,  economic  and  social  policy  across  Latin  America  is  shared 
(increasingly closely) between the IMF, the World Bank (and its private sector 
arm, the International Finance Corporation), the OECD, the IDB (Inter-American 
Development Bank), ECLAC (the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean) and other UN agencies such as UNCTAD and the UNDP. Each 
works in specific policy areas, sometimes with a particular focus (the OECD has 
taken a particular interest in competition policy, for example); ECLAC, the IDB 
and the World Bank’s Latin America and Caribbean Office develop and propose 
region-wide  frameworks  for  policy  reform;  and  most  work  with  individual 
countries in the region, either on particular issues, or across all  policy areas. 
Initiatives such as the long-established IMF Article IV consultations, the World 
Bank’s  Country  Assistance  and  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  programmes,  and 
OECD  work  on  competition  policy  are  characterised  by  varying  forms  of 
surveillance, benchmarking, monitoring and peer review. While these agencies 
have not been working together to a shared and preconceived blueprint, they 
have  been  working  individually  since  the  early  1990s  on  increasingly 
comprehensive  and  clearly  defined  programmes  which  are  increasingly  co-
ordinated,  and  they  are  capable  of  pursuing  a  flexible  division  of  labour  in 
accordance with political sensitivities in particular countries at particular  times.
In what follows I use the four-part framework identified for the EU to analyse 
the  promotion  of  competitiveness  in  Latin  America  through  a  comprehensive 
multi-level  programme  in  which  open  co-ordination  plays  a  central  part, 
identifying in turn (1) an overall goal of competitiveness, (2) a comprehensive 
set  of  policy  proposals  stretching  from  monetary,  economic  and  competition 
policy  to  complementary  areas  of  social  policy  (3)  a  framework  of 
implementation combining mandatory commitments with ‘soft law’ procedures; 
and  (4)  a  set  of  instruments  through  which  implementation  is  pursued, 
encompassing  in  particular  mutual  learning,  peer  review,  benchmarking,  and 
surveillance. While I seek to give a sense of the range of  institutions, methods 
and instruments  involved,  I  focus in  particular  on ECLAC’s  development  of  a 
competitiveness agenda over more than a decade, and on its recent studies of 
social  protection  and  social  cohesion  (ECLAC  2006,  2007),  which  reflect  the 
beginnings of the deliberate ‘Lisbonisation’ of policy-making in the region.
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The Politics of Competitiveness
I have discussed elsewhere (Cammack 2004) the extent to which Latin America 
is seized by the politics of competitiveness. Government after government has 
initiated a process  of  pro-competitiveness domestic reform with support  from 
bodies ranging from the OECD to UNCTAD and ECLAC; practically every one has 
reformed its competition law, and created a national competition authority with 
wide ranging-powers; and the various indexes of competitiveness produced by 
the World Economic Forum have become key points of reference in the region. 
The Forum's 2006 Latin American Competitiveness Review, quoted at the head of 
this  paper,  reflects  a  perspective  that  is  widely  shared  by  governments  and 
international institutions. The message from the WEF is that pro-competitiveness 
policies are working, and progress is being made, but that there is still a long 
way to go, both in terms of removing obstacles in the region, and in catching up 
with competitors outside it. So there can be no letting up; rather, advantage 
must be taken of relatively favourable circumstances to press on with “efforts to 
improve ... competitiveness and build the institutions and policies necessary for 
sustained economic growth and prosperity”. 
Within the region, it is the UN's regional economic commission, ECLAC, that has 
been the most consistent advocate of the need to address the issue of global 
competitiveness. Current  Executive Secretary and former Argentine Minister of 
the Economy José Luis Machinea could justifiably claim in introducing its 2006 
volume, Shaping the Future of Social Protection, that
Since the early 1990s, ECLAC has been advocating a new development 
paradigm that is better suited to a globalized world of open economies. 
While retaining the Commission’s long-standing focus on seeking out 
positive synergies between economic growth and social equity as part of a 
productive modernization process, this paradigm also underscores the 
importance of enhancing competitiveness, preserving macro-economic 
balances and strengthening a participatory and inclusive democratic political 
system. The idea at the core of this proposal is that the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies will have to transform their productive structures, as 
well as embarking upon an intensive programme of human capital 
formation, in order to move their development process forward (ECLAC, 
2006: 11, emphasis mine).
A process launched with the publication in 1990 of  Equidad y transformación 
productiva (Equity and the Transformation of Production) has produced a steady 
series of publications promoting a comprehensive agenda of reform.  From the 
start, ECLAC has argued for the need to transform production and productivity in 
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the region in order to achieve 'authentic competitiveness' in the global economy,5 
and the analysis it offers has been systemic throughout: 
Emphasis is placed on the systemic character of competitiveness. In the 
international market there compete economies in which the firm, although 
it is a crucial element, is integrated into a network of linkages with the 
educational system, the technological, energy and transport infrastructures, 
relations between employees and employers, the public and private 
institutional apparatus and the financial system: that is to say, it is 
integrated into a whole socio-economic system (ECLAC, 1990: n.p., 
translation mine).
At the time that the Lisbon process was being launched in the European Union, 
ECLAC was promoting its own comprehensive statement of pro-competitiveness 
policy  proposals,  Equidad,  desarrollo  y  ciudadanía (Equity,  Development  and 
Citizenship, ECLAC, 2000). Here as before, ECLAC placed education and labour 
market flexibility at the centre of the 'challenge of competitiveness', arguing that 
“systemic competitiveness requires .. a systemic increase in the quality of human 
resources and the acquisition of new skills”, and demonstrating from OECD data 
that  “the  countries  of  the  region  are  clearly  lagging  behind  their  principal 
competitors in the industrialized world as regards the availability of semi-skilled 
and skilled  labour,  the  indispensable  requisite  for  increasing  productivity  and 
maintaining  a  significant  competitive  impetus  in  the  global  market”  (ECLAC, 
2000: 111).  From the start  then, and throughout the period in which ECLAC 
developed and promoted its policy proposals, in conjunction with the IDB and the 
World  Bank  (Charnock,  2006),  the  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  symbiotic 
relationship between economic and social reform in the Latin American context.6 
5 The term, used consistently from 1990 onwards, was defined as follows in 2006: “First 
of all, ... more and better access to education and health raises the average level of 
human capital, which is crucial for sustainable growth and competitiveness in a world 
that increasingly values intelligence and innovation. It is also a decisive element in 
raising national economies’ average productivity. These are necessary conditions for 
the transition from spurious competitiveness (i.e. competitiveness based on low wages 
and over-exploitation of natural resources) to a genuine form of competitiveness based 
on the incorporation of intellectual value-added” (ECLAC 2006: 31, citing ECLAC 1990 
specifically as evidence of the long commitment to this perspective).
6 “The central objective of raising the levels of welfare of the population as a whole will 
not be achieved without significant advances in the consolidation of dynamic and 
competitive economies, capable of confronting the challenges of a globalized world. 
Equity and economic development, including the dimension of sustainable 
development, are, in this sense, elements of a single integrated strategy, which are 
related to each other in a complex manner. Social development cannot rest exclusively 
on social policy, just as growth and economic policy cannot in themselves guarantee 
the achievement of social objectives independently of the manner in which social policy 
is constructed” (ECLAC, 2000: 16).
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A Comprehensive Set of Policy Proposals
The  commitment  to  the  promotion  of  competitiveness  in  Latin  America  is 
underpinned, at least on the part of the international organisations and agencies 
mentioned above, by a wide-ranging analysis of specific structural features which 
explain  the  need  for  a  simultaneous  process  of  economic  and social  reform. 
These are (1) the highest levels of inequality of any region in the world; (2) the 
social, economic and cultural exclusion of significant sections of the population, 
and particularly majority indigenous ethnic groups (in Bolivia and Guatemala for 
example); (3) an inefficient and regressive taxation system heavily dominated by 
consumption  rather  than  income  or  property  taxes;  (4)  education  systems 
historically biased towards higher education, which leave substantial parts of the 
population poorly served; (5) a structure of production characterized by a large 
low-productivity informal sector and numerous under-capitalized and inefficient 
small and family firms; (6) an expensive and inefficient judicial system heavily 
biased towards the rich and powerful; (7) the persistence of clientelistic patterns 
of government that again allow politically favoured individuals privileged access, 
and (8)  as  a consequence  of  this,  high levels  of  dissatisfaction  with politics, 
governments, and pro-market reforms. 
The continued insistence on these points by international institutions involved in 
the  region  is  evidence  itself  of  the  limited  progress  that  has  been  made in 
addressing the majority of them. The World Bank's latest 'flagship report' on the 
region, taking forward the decade-long sequence of analyses examined in detail 
by  Charnock  (2006),  opens  with  the  uncompromising  statement  that  “Latin 
America's  twin  disappointments  of  relatively  weak  economic  growth  and 
persistent poverty and inequality are longstanding and intimately related”, and 
makes  the  point  in  particular  that  “Latin  American  countries  tend  to  have 
especially  low levels  of  collections  from personal  income and property  taxes” 
(World  Bank  2006a:  1,  19);  and  the  World  Economic  Forum identifies  Latin 
American experience with economic policy formulation and implementation over 
the past decade as “an excellent example of how institutional weaknesses can 
undermine  economic  reform,  growth  and  competitiveness”  (World  Economic 
Forum, 2006a:  12);  it  calls  for  progressive  tax  reform, and remarks that  “it 
comes as no surprise that the region has witnessed a steady deterioration in the 
public trust in politicians (ibid: 16). This latter point is strongly reinforced by 
ECLAC, in relation to the prospects for social cohesion.
10
Social protection and social cohesion 
ECLAC's 2007 volume on social cohesion massively documents the persistence of 
poverty, inequality and exclusion in the region, and reports for example, using 
data from Latinobarómetro, that fewer than one in four Latin Americans believe 
that all are equal before the law (and no more than 13 and 11 per cent in Brazil 
and Argentina respectively); three quarters are worried or very worried that they 
will  lose  their  jobs  in  the  next  twelve  months;  and  only  20  per  cent  have 
confidence in political parties (ECLAC, 2007: 74, 76, 79). While all the agencies 
and  institutions  discussed  so  far  identify  social  exclusion  as  an  issue  of 
fundamental importance, it is ECLAC which has offered by far the most extended 
analysis in this area, insisting on the right to social protection, and at the same 
time  setting  it  within  the  limits  and  the  logic  of  the  politics  of  global 
competitiveness. What is more, the terms in which it does this echo precisely the 
logic of reform proposed by the European Commission, as set out in Box 2 above 
(p. 6). This reflects the core of its diagnosis – that the legacy of social exclusion 
is  a  barrier  both  to  competitiveness-enhancing  reform  itself  and  to  popular 
acceptance  of  it.  In  this  respect,  ECLAC  argues  that  if  the  demands  of 
competitiveness and security have to be made compatible in the more developed 
OECD countries, “it is all the more necessary for medium and small countries 
such as the majority of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
are  characterized  by  being  more  open  and  vulnerable,  and  less  developed” 
(ECLAC, 2007: 110). 
First, then, the promotion of social cohesion and equal opportunities for all is 
addressed in ECLAC's proposal  for  a 'new social  covenant'  which echoes the 
terms agreed by the European Commission  (“adequate,  accessible,  financially 
sustainable, adaptable and efficient social protection systems and social inclusion 
policies”, Box 2 above). Universal social protection should be the goal, but
It is .. vital for the region’s societies to agree on ways to combine rights-
based development with the institutions and policies that will produce and 
allocate the resources needed to make those rights a reality. To accomplish 
this, social covenants will have to be forged between the various agents of 
the State and civil society within the framework of appropriate social 
institutions and authority to provide the necessary political strength and 
viability to move in that direction. These social pacts will also have to 
encompass fiscal covenants in order to ensure that the resources needed to 
implement such agreements will be available. This set of conditions will 
permit a gradual expansion of social protection systems’ accessibility, 
financing and solidarity components (ECLAC, 2006: 13).
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It follows that such policies must “interact closely with the [Lisbon] objectives 
on achieving greater economic growth and more and better jobs, and with the 
[EU's] Sustainable Development Strategy” (Box 2 above). Especially in the Latin 
American  context,  ECLAC  argues,  “providing  access  to  social  protection  and 
financing its benefits also demand a rapid pace of economic growth,” and in the 
meantime “the effort to establish a social covenant must .. be accompanied by 
an assessment of existing financial constraints and of possible mechanisms for 
overcoming them” (ibid: 14). This in turn poses a political challenge (the need to 
“strengthen governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in 
the design, implementation and monitoring of policy”, Box 2 above):
The aim is .. to develop links between the public voice, social empower-
ment, access to social protection benefits, and the creation of opportunities 
through the development of human capital. Steps must be taken to reverse 
the asymmetry existing between those who make themselves heard by 
using their collective bargaining power to ensure  their rights are protected 
and those who have less power and influence and who therefore find 
themselves unable to exercise those same rights” (ibid: 17-18).
All  these ideas come together in the 2007 volume on social  cohesion,  in the 
terms in which it recalls again the overall project on which ECLAC is engaged, 
and locates its approach to social cohesion within it:
Since the early 1990s ECLAC has been constructing a vision of development 
suited to a globalized world of open economies. This is a matter of 
encouraging positive synergies between economic growth and social equity 
in the context of the modernization of production. Special significance is 
therefore accorded to the objectives of enhancing competitiveness, keeping 
watch over macro-economic balances, and strengthening a participatory 
and inclusive democratic political system. In this context, the thinking that 
ECLAC now sets out in this volume represents an attempt to give social 
cohesion a greater profile, identity and depth, which will allow it to become 
a significant reference point in public policy (ECLAC, 2007: 9-10).
Point for point, then, the framework within which ECLAC approaches the issues of 
social protection and social  cohesion coincides with the overarching objectives 
adopted by the European Union. It is not the argument here, however, that this 
represents a direct influence, as similar ideas are current  at the World Bank and 
elsewhere, and the analysis is consistent with ECLAC's approach over more than 
a decade. Rather, the point here is that there is  little that is unique about the 
project on which the EU is engaged, or its logic.
This is equally the case with the eradication of poverty and social exclusion. 
ECLAC's approach rests on three pillars: opportunities, capacities, and protection. 
While the third is concerned primarily with methods of financing, the first two 
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map directly  onto  the  EU's  three-part  strategy  of  ensuring  the  active  social 
inclusion of all  by promoting participation in the labour market; guaranteeing 
access  for  all  to  the  most  basic  resources,  rights  and  social  services  while 
addressing extreme forms of exclusion; and ensuring that social inclusion policies 
involve  all  levels  of  government  and  relevant  actors,  including  people 
experiencing poverty ..  and are gender mainstreamed (Box 2, above). 
Social cohesion is to be addressed by enhancing productive opportunities, or 
access to employment (ECLAC, 2007: 105-6). This entails a transition from the 
informal to the formal sector, along with measures to extend access to the labour 
market: “So policies that reconcile productive and reproductive labour in order 
to  guarantee  poor  women  better  prospects  of  incorporation  into  the  labour 
market, with adequate pre-school and nursery care are fundamental” (ibid: 107). 
The  essential  requirement,  promoted  by  ECLAC  for  a  number  of  years 
(Cammack, 2004: 262-4; ECLAC, 2004, Ch. 9), is a switch from low-productivity 
informal labour to 'flexicurity', or flexiseguridad (ECLAC, 2007: 107).7 Strategies 
must combine employment, social and labour protection and fiscal responsibility” 
(ECLAC,  2007:  108).  Hence  the  need  for  'flexicurity',  active  labour  market 
policies, called for by circumstances very similar to those obtaining in Italy, Spain 
and Portugal (ibid: 109): Precisely because fiscal resources are so scarce, the 
route to social inclusion and cohesion lies through the greater productivity that 
can come from flexible labour and enhanced access to the labour market. 
Against this background, the development of capacities through education is the 
essential  second  pillar,  so  long  as  three  necessary  types  of  action  are 
undertaken: the promotion of  greater equity in educational  opportunities; the 
building of closer links between the world of education and the world of work (in 
part to facilitate the transition from one to the other and in part to mitigate the 
gap  between  expectations  and  reality  when  students  find  themselves  in  a 
'refractory' labour market), and third, “to reverse the forms of discrimination that 
arise from dynamics of socialization and transmission in the educational sphere, 
in order to allow education to become an experience of learning based on respect 
for diversity and reciprocal rights” (ibid: 112, and 112-119). 
7 The 2004 volume advocated “active public policies .. backed by the political legitimacy 
afforded by democratic institutions and .. founded upon public transparency as well as 
efficient, effective government programmes subject to strict oversight and evaluation” 
(ECLAC 2004:  13), and made suggestions “concerning steps that could be taken to 
contribute to a form of flexible employment combined with social protection 
mechanisms based on a fiscally responsible social cohesion covenant” (ibid: 15).
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A differentiated framework of implementation
There are strong parallels between Latin America and the European Union, then, 
in  the  commitment  of regional  and global  institutions  to  the  promotion  of  a 
politics of competitiveness, and its dissemination across a wide range of policy 
areas. ECLAC has played a leading role, operating at the softest end of 'soft law', 
primarily through expert advice. This is generally the case with other institutions 
– as with the World Bank's promotion of itself as a knowledge bank, and the 
stream of policy advice offered across the region through its flagship Viewpoints 
series (Charnock, 2006). Similar examples are provided by the  Latin American 
Competition Forum first convened by the OECD in 2003, and meeting annually 
thereafter (Cammack, 2004), and the OECD's periodic economic surveys of its 
members (such as Mexico) and non-members (such as Brazil  and Chile). The 
World Economic Forum's Competitiveness Review, and the accompanying 'World 
Economic Forum on Latin America' held in São Paulo, Brazil, in April 2006 (World 
Economic Forum, 2006b) provide further examples.
Parallels can also be found in the region to the harder Treaty-based processes 
operated  within  the  European  Union;  they  are  generally  associated  with  the 
Bretton Woods institutions. First, the PRSP process mentioned above, in which 
the IMF and World Bank engage heavily indebted poor countries, has some of the 
characteristics of the accession process facing candidates for EU membership, in 
that sovereign countries submit themselves to binding requirements in pursuit of 
access – in  this  case to international  finance (Cammack, 2002).  Second,  the 
Country Assistance Strategies on which the World Bank engages with individual 
countries (also mentioned above), on which the provision of World Bank funding 
depends, share something with the dealings of the Commission with EU member 
countries  over  economic  and  fiscal  policy  –  notably  in  the  fact  that  the 
agreement and publication of 'Economic Policy Guidelines' (in this case by the 
'assisted' country rather than by the Bank) now features as part of the process.8 
And third,  in a process comparable to the EU's issuing of  directives  that are 
subsequently  incorporated  into  national  law,  both  Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia 
and Peru have passed Laws of Fiscal Responsibility on lines heavily promoted by 
the IMF and the World Bank (Webb, 2004).
8 See World Bank, 2006b, Appendix A, 70-81. This document, which parrots faultlessly 
the principal guidelines of World Bank (and ECLAC) strategy, should be required 
reading forf anyone who doubts the hold of this policy framework over such 
'heterodox' countries as Argentina and Brazil. 
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Instruments: surveillance, benchmarking, peer review and mutual learning
The proliferation of instruments of surveillance, benchmarking, peer review and 
mutual learning is discussed in the first paper in this series, with reference to the 
OECD (Going  for  Growth),  the  World  Bank  (Doing  Business),  and  the  World 
Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index (Cammack, 2006a, 9-12). They 
can be briefly illustrated here for Latin America with reference to the material 
discussed in previous sections, taking each of the elements in turn.
Surveillance:  The  2002  Country  Assistance  Strategy  (CAS)  prepared  by  the 
World Bank for Nicaragua, one of the few Latin American countries enrolled in 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process, reviews and reports on every aspect of 
policy, and includes a Matrix listing 67 indicators against which progress will be 
measured,  ranging  from the  size  of  the  fiscal  deficit  to  the  number  (25)  of 
telemetric hydrometry stations to be installed (World Bank, 2002, Annex B1). 
The 2006 Strategy for Argentina (a 'sovereign' state outside the PRSP process) 
contains  a similarly comprehensive review of policy, and  a similar Matrix with 
targets for 2009 (World Bank 2006b, Annex K).
Benchmarking:  The  Latin  American  Competitiveness  Review benchmarks  the 
region against other emerging markets, with disturbing results (Table 1):
Table 1: Regional comparators for drivers of competitiveness
Latin America 
and Caribbean
India China Central & 
E. Europe
East Asian 
NICs
Infrastructure 5 4 3 2 1
Goods market 
efficiency
5 2 3 4 1
Labour market 
efficiency
5 3 4 2 1
Financial market 
efficiency
4 5 2 3 1
Technological 
readiness
5 4 3 2 1
Innovation 5 3 2 4 1
Source: World Economic Forum, 2006a, Figs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11.
In addition, it reports on the ranking of individual countries. Only Chile (ranked 
27th overall of 117, though 1st for macro-economic stability) makes it into the 
first 50 in the General Competitiveness Index, and the region as a whole gets a 
negative report card (ibid: 7). The World Bank's  Doing Business league tables, 
discussed  elsewhere  (Cammack  2006a),  present  a  similar  picture  of  Latin 
American laggardliness. 
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Peer  review and mutual  learning:  Here,  a clear  example is  provided by the 
OECD- and IDB-supported peer reviews of competition policy, of which so far 
four have taken place within the framework of the Latin American Competition 
Forum,  involving  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Peru.  Within  this  framework, 
discussed  for  the  earlier  reviews  in  Cammack  (2004)  countries  volunteer  to 
subject  themselves  to  review,  and  act  in  turn  as  rapporteurs  in  the  review 
process (OECD/IDB 2006). 
Addendum: from Lisbon-like processes to Lisbonisation?
Ample evidence can be found across Latin America,  then,  of  policy proposals 
oriented to global competitiveness and of particular practices associated with the 
Lisbon process and the OMC. ECLA's 2007 volume on social cohesion takes a step 
further  towards  'Lisbonisation'  proper  by  proposing  the  direct  emulation  of 
benchmarking mechanisms central to open coordination. This is not surprising – 
the study was funded in part by the EUROsociAL Programme of the European 
Commission, agreed at the (fourth) EU-LAC summit in Guadalajara, Mexico in 
2004 to support the chosen theme of social  cohesion in Latin America.9 First, 
then, this initiative reflects the extension of the Open Method of Coordination to 
Latin America, as part of the foreign relations of the EU. Second, it has prompted 
ECLAC to consider the direct adoption of EU methods of coordination. 
According  to  ECLAC,  the  realization  of  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights 
“presupposes the establishment of some indicators with respect to the advance 
in their consolidation, drawn up on the basis of targets and standards” (ECLAC, 
2007: 28).  Such a system of  indicators  would  make it  possible  to “establish 
minimum  standards,  map  out  (dimensionar)  situations  of  discrimination  and 
exclusion, and examine the effectiveness of public policies” (ibid: 29). With this 
preamble, after a brief account of the Lisbon Agenda, the discussion of the issue 
of social cohesion at the Nice Council, and the Open Method of Coordination, a 
chapter is devoted the Laeken indicators, and the prospects for the development 
of a similar set of indicators for Latin America and the Caribbean (ibid: 29-41). It 
appears, then, that the parallel processes outlined in this paper are converging, 
in cooperation rather than competition with each other.
9 The programme, bringing the EU's social agenda to Latin America, was confirmed at 
the Vienna summit of 2006, and will be taken forward at the EU-LAC Forum on Social 
Cohesion in Santiago, Chile (the home of ECLAC) in the autumn of 2007. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/la/sc/sc_en/04_analysis_en.htm for further 
details.
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Conclusion: competitiveness and convergence in Europe and Latin America
So reforms are starting to feed through into growth and jobs. The evidence is 
building.  Europe's  economy  is  growing  more  strongly  than  for  many  years. 
Seven million new jobs will be created in Europe in the three years to 2008. Part 
of this is cyclical, but part of the extra growth and jobs is the result of Lisbon 
reforms.  We have  also  benefited  from the  new dynamism  brought  about  by 
enlargement.  As  Member  States'  economies  have  grown  increasingly 
interdependent, the positive effects of reforms to boost growth and jobs in one 
Member  State  -  particularly  the  larger  economies  -  are  felt  in  all  others. 
Structural  reforms  implemented  across  the  whole  of  the Union  pay  a higher 
dividend  than  those  implemented  piecemeal.  So  we  are  moving  in  the  right 
direction. But this is not a time to relax. We should use the progress so far to 
encourage  swifter  and  deeper  reforms  – for  political  leaders  to  promote  the 
compelling case for modernisation and the benefits it will bring to citizens. The 
next twelve months should see more market opening to stimulate innovation and 
give our consumers a better deal; a further push to open markets worldwide and 
bring  new  opportunities  to  European  business;  a  better  balance  between 
flexibility and security in labour markets; and more progress on the quality of 
our education systems. The improved economic situation should be viewed as an 
opportunity to do more – not an excuse to do less. I believe 2007 will see real 
dynamism in the European economy, and an effective platform for the mid-term 
review of Lisbon in 2008.
José Manuel Durão Barroso, 'Preface', Communication from the commission to 
the Spring European Council. Implementing the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs: “A Year of Delivery” (European Commission, 2006b).
José Manuel Barroso’s role as President of the European Commission is unique in 
the world. The remarks quoted above – prefacing his annual report to the Spring 
Meeting of the European Council, are part of a highly institutionalised system 
through which the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs has been pursued since 
2000, and within which the Open Method of Co-ordination is formally established 
as a means of policy development and transfer. The annual report to the Spring 
Council  (which met in Brussels,  8-9 March 2007) included not only Barroso's 
review and proposal  for 'next steps',  but also an assessment of the progress 
made by each member state, in turn based on a formal process involving the 
production and scrutiny of National Reform Programmes intended to implement 
the Lisbon Agenda; the Council also received a report on social protection and 
social inclusion, based on the first integrated national reports on strategies for 
social inclusion, pensions, healthcare and long-term care submitted by Member 
States  (European  Council  2007a);  and  the  Presidency  Conclusions  from  the 
meeting left no room for doubt as to the comprehensive strategy that is pursued 
through the 'Lisbon Agenda', as it called on Member States and EU institutions to 
pursue actions to “strengthen the internal market and competitiveness, create 
better framework conditions for innovation and greater investment in research 
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and  development,  boost  quality  employment  and  improve  social  cohesion” 
(European Council, 2007b: 1), and went on to outline a comprehensive policy 
framework  along  these  lines.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  debate  around 
European integration, the Lisbon Strategy, and subsidiary elements such as the 
open  method  of  co-ordination  has  not  strayed  far  outside  the  EU  and  its 
specialist literature. 
 Yet  Barroso's  message  to  the  Council  reflects  a  universal  concern,  among 
governments and international institutions, with global competitiveness, and it 
takes a standard form (we are moving in the right direction; but there is more to 
be done; and now is the time to do it). Klaus Schwab, as President of the World 
Economic  Forum,  has  none  of  the  attributes  of  Barroso.  But  the  report  his 
remarks preface plays the same role in relation to Latin America that the report 
to  the  European Council  plays  in  the  European context  –  reviewing progress 
towards  global  competitiveness  (and drawing on a  range of  benchmarks and 
indicators to do so), and proposing next steps for the region. Similarly, the UN's 
Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  has  none  of  the 
formal  attributes  of  the  European  Commission.  But  it  has  developed  and 
disseminated comprehensive policy proposals that coincide exactly and in detail 
will  those  propagated  by  the  European  Commission.  And  in  Latin  American 
governments  do  not  submit  National  Reform Programmes  to  either  of  these 
institutions, those they submit to the IMF and the World Bank play the same 
role, and similarly revolve around comprehensive programmes anchored in the 
commitment  to  monetary,  fiscal  and financial  discipline,  intended to promote 
global competitiveness, and engaged in the pursuit of social cohesion.
This suggests that an appreciation of the issues involved here should begin with 
an  analysis  of  the  character  and  dynamics  of  the  politics  of  global 
competitiveness, rather than with the specific institutional and procedural forms 
it takes in the particular case of the European Union. Second, it strongly supports 
the  argument  that  international  institutions  (including  the  EU  Commission) 
should  be  seen  as  playing  a  meta-governmental  role  oriented,  as  suggested 
above,  towards  prompting  states  to  compete  with  each  other  in  ways  that 
promote rather than run counter to competitiveness on a global level. This in 
turn  provides  further  evidence  to  support  the  suggestion  that  international 
institutions operate 'relatively autonomously' in the promotion of capitalism on a 
global scale (Cammack, 2003).
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